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Was the Third Circuit Off Base in Failing to Accord
Chevron Deference to Social Security Administration's
Interpretation of the Statute's Definition of Disability?
Victor G. Rosenblum*
Invoking the principle that "[o]ther things being equal, a statute
should be read to avoid absurd results," the en bane Third Circuit
U.S. Court of Appeals, divided 6-3, refused to defer to the Social
Security Administration's ("SSA") construction of the definition of
"disability" in its enabling statute and reversed the Agency's denial
of disability benefits in Thomas v. Commissioner of Social Security
on June 21, 2002.1 The Third Circuit's ruling that "disability" must
be evaluated in relation to existence of "substantial gainful activity"
was not only at odds with the SSA's but with precedents from the
Fourth,2 Sixth, 3 Eighth, 4 and Ninth Circuits.5 Only the Seventh
Circuit had expressed an interpretive view of the SSA statute similar
to the Third Circuit's, and that was in dicta. 6 This article addresses

* Nathaniel L. Nathanson Professor of Law Emeritus at Northwestern
University School of Law.
1. 294 F.3d 568, 572 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. granted, Bamhart v. Thomas, 71
U.S.L.W. 3390 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2003) (No. 02-763).
2. See Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200 (4th Cir. 1995).
3. See Garcia v. Sec'y of Health and Human Serv., 46 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 1995).
4. See Rater v. Chater, 73 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 1996).
5. See Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1989).
6. See Kolman v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1991), affd Kolman v.
Shalala, 39 F.3d 173 (7th Cir. 1994). The ruling reversing SSA was premised on
the fact, not present in the Thomas case, that claimant's past job was a temporary
training position. Id. at 214. The panel went on to say, in dictum, that it would not
be "a rational ground for denying benefits" to rule that a claimant could perform a
past job that no longer exists. Id. at 213.
The failure of the regulations to require that the job
constituting the applicant's past work exist in significant
numbers probably just reflects an assumption that jobs that

350

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

22-2

whether the Third Circuit's decision violated the Supreme Court's
requirements for judicial deference to agency interpretations and
should be repudiated.
A. The SSA Statute's Text on "Disability" and the Agency's
Implementing Regulations
Central to the dichotomy between SSA supporters and the
majority of the Third Circuit was construction of the language of the
Social Security statute defining "disability" and setting forth explicit
criteria for determining when an individual is disabled.7
Section 423(d) of 42 U.S.C. provides:
(1) The term "disability" means(A) inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months .... 8
After defining disability, the statute sets forth particular criteria to
govern determinations that an individual is under a disability:
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A) (A) An individual shall be determined to be
under a disability only if his physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity
that he is not only unable to do his previous work
but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of

existed five or ten or even fifteen years ago still exist. But if
the assumption is dramatically falsified in a particular case,
the administrative law judge is required to move on to the
next stage and inquire whether some other job that the
applicant can perform exists in significant numbers today
somewhere in the national economy.
Id. at 213-14.
7. Thomas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 294 F.3d 568, 572-74 (3d Cir. 2002).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)-(1)(A) (1994).
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substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such
work exists in the immediate area in which he
lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
him, or whether he would be hired if he applied
for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence
(with respect to any individual), "work which
exists in the national economy" means work which
exists in significant numbers either in the region
where such individual lives or in several regions of
the country. 9
Having worked as a housekeeper until a heart attack imposed
limitations on her physical activity, Pauline Thomas then worked as
an elevator operator until she was laid off in 1995 when her position
was eliminated. 0 Claiming disability related to cardiac problems and
maintaining that the position of elevator operator was no longer
available in significant numbers in the national economy, Thomas
applied for Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income
Benefits. 11

SSA regulations for applying the statute's criteria to determine
disability in individual cases provide for a five step sequential
evaluation process. Whether the claimant was "currently engaging in
a substantial gainful activity" is the subject of step one;' 2 it was clear
that Thomas was not so engaged. 13 At step two, the Commissioner
4
must determine "whether the claimant has a severe impairment;"'
Thomas was found to have an impairment whose degree was still in
question. 15 At step three, it must be determined whether the
6
claimant's impairment was severe enough to preclude gainful work;'
an agency ALJ found that Thomas' impairment was not severe

9. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)-(2)(A) (1994).

10. Thomas, 294 F.3d at 570.
11. Id.
12. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b) (2002).
13. Thomas, 294 F.3d at 570.
14. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (2002).

15. Thomas, 294 F.3d at 570.
16. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) (2002).
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enough to preclude any gainful work.' 7 If, at step three, a claimant is
not found to suffer from an impairment on the list of impairments
presumed to be severe8 enough to preclude gainful work, the inquiry
proceeds to step four.'
Step four - the key step at issue in this case - focused on the duty

of the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant retained
residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work. 19 The
burden is on the claimant to demonstrate his or her inability to return
to past relevant work.20 Thomas argued that she could not return to
her past relevant work because jobs as elevator operators were no
longer available in the national economy to offer substantial gainful
activity. 2 ' Finding, under step four, that Thomas could perform her
previous job as an elevator operator, the ALI ruled that she was not
under a disability. 22 The evaluation ended without any inquiry into

whether the past work Thomas could do actually existed in the
present and without proceeding to step five. Had step five been
pursued, the Commissioner would have had to show that Thomas
was capable of performing other jobs existing in significant numbers
in the national economy, and if not, to find her disabled.2 3

Thomas, 294 F.3d at 570.
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 570.
Id. The SSA regulations describe step four in this way:
Your impairment(s) must prevent you from doing past
relevant work. If we cannot make a decision based on your
current work activity or on medical facts alone, and you have
a severe impairment(s), we then review your residual
functional capacity and the physical and mental demands of
the work you have done in the past. If you can still do this
kind of work, we will find that you are not disabled.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (2002).
23. The SSA regulations describe step five in this way:
Your impairment(s) must prevent you from doing any
other work. (1) If you cannot do any work you have done in
the past because you have a severe impairment(s), we will
consider your residual functional capacity and your age,
education, and past work experience to see if you can do
other work. If you cannot, we will find you disabled.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
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After SSA's Appeals Council denied Thomas' request for review
of the ALJ's decision, and her challenge to SSA's ruling failed in
Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey, Thomas sought
24
redress in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
The majority and the dissent in the Court of Appeals divided
sharply over whether sections of the Social Security Act at issue were
clear and consistent with the Agency's regulations, were clear and
inconsistent with the regulations, or were ambiguous and therefore
25
entitled the Agency to deference.

B. Views of the Third Circuit'sMajority
To the majority, the district court's affirmation of the Agency's
denial that the existence of "substantial gainful work" was an integral
component of any evaluation of "disability" was "inconsistent with
both a careful reading of the particular provision at issue and the
obvious statutory scheme." 26 The Agency's cramped reading of its
regulation regarding step four set up "an artificial roadblock to an
accurate determination of whether Thomas can 'engage in any . . .
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy. ' ' 27 The majority proclaimed: "[W]e cannot lose sight of
the fact that the touchstone of 'disability' is the inability to engage in
'
any substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. "28
The SSA's "rigid application of Step Four . .
could defeat
Congress's unambiguous intent., 29 Citing United States v. Mead
Corp.30 and Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense Council3 ' for the

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (2002).
24. Thomas, 294 F.3d at 568.
25. Id. at 575-79.

26. Id. at 569.
27. Id. at 574 (quoting 42 U.S.C § 423(d)(2)(A) (1994)).
28. Id. at 574.

29. Id.
30. United States v. Mead Corp., 553 U.S. 218, 226 (2001).
31. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). The
pertinent Chevron language was: "Such legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute."
Id. To the same effect, Judge Alito could also have invoked Chevron's text and
footnote nine at pages 842-43. Id. at 843 & n.9. The widely quoted text provides:
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proposition that "a court should not follow a regulation that is
manifestly contrary to the statute," the majority concluded "we must
reject such an approach."3 2
The Third Circuit majority found "unconvincing" the
Commissioner's argument that permitting a claimant at step four to
show that her past job does not exist in significant
numbers in the national economy would convert
disability benefits into unemployment benefits.
Awarding disability benefits to a claimant who, as a
result of a qualifying impairment, cannot perform any
job that actually exists is hardly the equivalent of
providing unemployment compensation. By contrast,
denying benefits because a claimant could perform a

type of job that does not exist seems nonsensical.33
Judge Alito's majority recognized that the Ninth and the Sixth
Circuit Courts found the SSA statute's language in 42 U.S.C. §
423(a)(2) to be "ambiguous" and entitled to deference, but he insisted
that their readings were not consistent with "standard usage." 34 He
was also aware that the Fourth and Eighth Circuit Courts agreed
of disability, 35 but he argued
explicitly with SSA's interpretation
'
"neither opinion [wa]s persuasive. "36
Judge Alito emphasized the significance of Congress's use of the
term "any other" in making evaluations of disability under 42 U.S.C.
"If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter, for the Court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress." Id. at 843. Footnote nine iterates that "[t]he judiciary is the final
authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative
constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." Id. at 843, n.9.
32. Thomas, 294 F.3d at 574.
33. Id. (citation omitted).
In Bowen, the Ninth Circuit maintained that SSA's
34. Id. at 572.
interpretation "is a reasonable interpretation of the statute, but not the only one. It
is also reasonable to construe 'previous work' and 'other' work as separate
categories, neither a subset of the other." Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d
1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1989). The Sixth Circuit echoed this view in Garcia. Garcia
v. Sec'y of Health and Human Serv., 46 F.3d 552, 558 (6th Cir. 1995).
35. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1204 (4th Cir. 1995); Rater v. Chater, 73
F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 1996).
36. Thomas, 294 F.3d at 575.
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§ 423(d)(2)(A). 37 Use of the phrase "any other" in this provision, he
maintained, "makes clear that an individual's 'previous work' was
regarded as a type of 'substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy."' 38 Judge Alito proceeded to enlarge on what
standard usage of "any other" mandates:
When a sentence sets out one or more specific items
followed by "any other" and a description, the specific
items must fall within the description. For example, it
makes sense to say: "I have not seen a tiger or any
other large cat" or "I have not read Oliver Twist or any
other novel which Charles Dickens wrote." But it
would make no sense to say, "I have not seen a tiger
or any other bird" or "I have not read Oliver Twist or
any other novel which Leo Tolstoy wrote." Therefore,
if we presume that the statutory provisions at issue
here are written in accordance with correct usage, a
claimant's ability to perform "previous work" is not
disqualifying if that work no longer "exists in the
national economy." This feature of the statutory
39
language is unambiguous.
As to why the Fourth and Eighth Circuit decisions in Pass v.
Chater and Rater v. Chater adopting SSA's interpretation of
"disability" were not persuasive, Judge Alito said that "[b]oth
decisions rely primarily on the Social Security regulations and on
Social Security rulings. Neither opinion, in our judgment, devotes

37. Id. at 572.
38. Id.
39. Id. (citation omitted). Even if 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(2) were ambiguous,
Judge Alito went on:
[O]ur interpretation would not change. Other things being
equal, a statute should be read to avoid absurd results. Here,
there is no plausible reason why Congress might have
wanted to deny benefits to an otherwise qualified person
simply because that person, although unable to perform any
job that actually exists in the national economy, could
perform a previous job that no longer exists.
Id. at 572-73 (citation omitted).
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sufficient40attention to the language of the statute or the statutory
scheme."
Judge Alito did not elaborate on what he meant by "sufficient
attention" to the statute's language. Although the Pass and Rater
41
decisions did emphasize Social Security regulations and rulings,
they did not bypass analysis of the statute's text. In Pass, for
example, the Fourth Circuit panel relied on the SSA statute's
requirement that inability to perform substantial gainful activity be
"by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment" and inferentially, not by reason of marketplace
conditions. 42

In other words, a finding of disability under the statute
must be based upon a lack of physical or mental
capabilities on the part of the claimant, not upon other
factors which prevent the claimant from obtaining
work. The Social Security regulations addressing past
relevant work reflect the statute's focus on the
functional capacity retained by the claimant.43
Furthermore, at the end of its opinion in Pass, the Fourth Circuit
quoted approvingly from the Sixth Circuit's statutory interpretation
in Garcia: "'Congress intended to distinguish sharply between
unemployment compensation and the disability benefits provided by
the Act. Congress manifested this intention by defining 'disability'
medical determination as opposed
under the Act as a predominantly
4 4
one.,,
to a vocational

40. Id. at 575 (citing Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1204 (4th Cir. 1995); Rater
v. Chater, 73 F.3d 796 (8th Cir. 1996)).
41. See Pass, 65 F.3d at 1204-05 (invoking Social Security Rulings 82-61 and
82-40); see Rater 73 F.3d at 798-99 (relying on Social Security Ruling 82-61).
42. Pass, 65 F.3d at 1203 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994) (defining
the word "disability")).
43. Id. at 1204.
44. Id. at 1207 (quoting Garcia v. Sec'y of Health and Human Serv., 46 F.3d
552, 559 (6th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)). Given its endorsement of SSA's
reading of the statute, the Pass panel's admonition to courts toward the end of its
opinion was no surprise: "If the analysis of disability under the Social Security Act
is to be changed, it is for Congress or the Social Security Administration, not the
courts, to do so." Id.
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The Eighth Circuit endorsed SSA's interpretation of "disability"
in Rater, explicitly rejecting claimant's argument that the statute
requires past relevant work to exist in significant numbers within the
national economy. 45 The unanimous panel added: "The statute does
not require a particular job to exist in significant numbers
in the
46
national economy in order to constitute past relevant work.,
The Third Circuit majority's reading of the SSA statute in
Thomas clearly and emphatically opposed that of the Fourth Circuit's
in Pass and the Eighth Circuit's in Rater.47 The underlying dispute
in the disagreement was not so much over sufficiency of attention to
the SSA statute's text as over the bearing of the statute's terms
"substantial gainful activity" and "substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy" on the determination of
"disability." 48 The Fourth and Eighth Circuits subordinated those
terms of the text to the primacy in their view of the statute's
requirement that inability be "by reason of' the claimant's "physical
or mental impairment . .. of such severity" as to be unable to do

previous or any other work. On the other hand, the focus of the
statute's language to the Third Circuit majority was on the
juxtaposition of "disability" and "inability" with "substantial gainful
work" and the use of "any other" to confirm Congress's concern that
"substantial gainful work" must exist in order to validate denial of
"disability" to an impaired claimant.49
C. Views of the Third Circuit Minority
The three judge minority in Thomas, led by Judge Rendell,
charged that the majority's rejection of the Agency's regulatory
scheme in steps four and five was "unprecedented" and that its
interpretation of the SSA statute, tantamount to a "rewriting," will
"wreak havoc with the evidentiary aspects of the administrative

45. Rater, 73 F.3d at 799.
46. Id. (citing Social Security Ruling 82-61).
47. Thomas, 294 F.3d at 570-72. But see Pass, 65 F.3d at 1203-04; Rater, 73
F.3d at 799.
48. Thomas, 294 F.3d at 570-72.
49. Id. at 578.
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process." 50 As to why Congress might have wanted to deny benefits
to someone in Pauline Thomas's position, it is "quite plausible that
Congress decided that if a claimant still retained the physical and
mental capacity to do whatever work she previously did, the inquiry
should end there with a finding that claimant is not disabled."'" The
dissenting opinion went on to state that:
[Congress's use of] [p]revious work [as a governing
standard] essentially serves as a proxy for the ability
to perform work, not as proof that the claimant can be
employed in that particular job. Congress may not, in
fact, have considered the problem of job obsolescence,
but . . .it is not up to the courts to fill that alleged

legislative void.52
Even if the SSA statute cannot be read to explicitly equate with
the Agency's regulations, Judge Rendell maintained, one can only
conclude that "the statute is at best ambiguous. Accordingly, the
Agency's interpretation should be accorded great weight."53 The
minority relied at this juncture on the Supreme Court's 2002 decision
in Barnhart v. Walton, which reendorsed Chevron's formulaic
language:
[I]f the statute speaks clearly "to the precise question
at issue," we "must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." If, however, the statute
"is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue," we must sustain the Agency's interpretation if
it is "based on a permissible construction" of the
Act.

54

Examining the Walton case, which Judge Alito bypassed, Judge
Rendell charged that the majority acted contrary to Walton's
requirements by virtue of its "unwillingness to defer to the Agency's
authority to regulate. ' 55 Judge Rendell quoted Walton's explicit
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 577.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 578.
Barnhart v. Walton, 122 S. Ct. 1265, 1269 (2002) (citations omitted).
Thomas, 294 F.3d at 578. But see Walton, 122 S. Ct. at 1269.
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endorsement of SSA discretion: "'The [Social Security Act's]
complexity, the vast number of claims that it engenders, and the
consequent need for agency expertise and administrative experience
lead us to read the statute as delegating to the Agency considerable
authority to fill in, through interpretation, matters of detail related to
its administration. '56
Walton ruled explicitly that Chevron deference was due the
Social Security Administration's interpretation of "impairment . ..
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months" in its evaluations
of "disability" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).5 7 Given the
unanimity of the Supreme Court's judgment prescribing Chevron
deference for SSA's interpretation of this facet of the definition of
"disability," can the'Third Circuit's ruling in Thomas survive
Supreme Court scrutiny?
D. Possible Scenarios in the Supreme Courtfor
Disposition of Thomas
The possibility cannot be easily dismissed that the Supreme Court
would, citing Walton, summarily reverse the Third Circuit's decision
in Thomas without more. After all, Justice Breyer was eloquent,
emphatic and unconditional in concluding that Chevron deference
was mandatory for SSA's interpretation in Walton.58
In the rare situation in which the Supreme Court has reversed an
SSA ruling, it has required unauthorized and misleading action on the
56. Thomas, 294 F.3d at 578 (quoting Walton, 122 S. Ct. at 1273) (alteration in
original). Unquoted by Judge Rendell, Justice Breyer, earlier in his opinion in
Walton, used even stronger language that could be construed as endorsing the
dissenting position in Thomas:
In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal question..
the importance of the question to administration of the
statute, the complexity of that administration and the careful
consideration the Agency has given the question over a long
period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the
appropriate legal lens through which to view the legality of
the Agency interpretation here at issue.
Walton, 122 S. Ct. at 1272.
57. Walton, 122 S. Ct. at 1272.
58. Id.
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Agency's part to convince the Justices to blow the whistle. 59 Even
then, as in Sims v. Apfel where the Court reversed SSA's requirement

of issue exhaustion in Agency proceedings as a condition of
obtaining judicial review of such issues by SSA claimants, only a
bare majority could be mustered to counter the Agency. 60 The
dissenters in Sims - Justices Breyer, Scalia, Rehnquist, and Kennedy
- continued to urge judicial acceptance of the Agency's position,
pointing out that "[p]ractical considerations arising out of the
agency's familiarity with the subject matter as well as institutional
considerations caution strongly against courts' deciding ordinary,
circumstance-specific matters that the parties have not raised before
6
the agency." '

Although the Supreme Court's unanimous call for deference to
SSA in Walton might control a future ruling in Thomas, the issues
raised by the Justices and their resolution in Walton do not compel
rejection of the Third Circuit majority's approach in Thomas.
Judge Alito emphasized in the Third Circuit's ruling that the SSA

statute integrally ties "disability" to "inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity."62 Ability so to engage is a function of

59. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000).
60. Id
61. Id. at 116 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, for the plurality,
objected to SSA's imposition of the issue exhaustion requirement in order to
prevent judicial review of such issues because the SSA statute said nothing of issue
exhaustion and the Agency itself had failed to adopt regulations requiring issue
exhaustion. Id. at 107-10. To the contrary, the Agency had encouraged claimants
to believe that the administrative review process would be conducted by the
Agency "in an informal, nonadversary manner." 20 C.F.R. § 404.900 (b) (2002).
Justice Thomas noted that the Agency's form given to claimants seeking Appeals
Council review provided only three lines for the request for review and its notice
accompanying the form told claimants "it will take only 10 minutes to 'read the
instructions, gather the necessary facts and fill out the form' . . . [Issue exhaustion]

'makes little sense in this particular context."' Id. at 112 (quoting Hardwood v.
Apfel, 186 F.3d 1039, 1042 (1999)). Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment,
maintaining that "the agency's failure to notify claimants of an issue exhaustion
requirement in this context is a sufficient basis for our decision. Requiring issue
exhaustion is particularly inappropriate here, where [SSA] regulation[s] and
procedures ...

affirmatively suggest that specific issues need not be raised before

the Appeals Council." Id. at 113 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
62. Thomas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 294 F.3d 568, 574 (3d Cir. 2002).
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the state of the marketplace as well as of the physical and mental
capacity of the claimant. This emphasis on the joint relevance to
disability of marketplace and personal capacity by the Third Circuit
majority was in no way refuted or even considered by the Justices in
Walton.
Central to the Supreme Court's ruling was whether the claimant
had violated the SSA statute's requirements by having engaged in
substantial gainful activity within less than twelve months of
The Justices ruled
suffering physical or mental impairment.
unanimously that the SSA statute was ambiguous on that point
because "[i]t says nothing about how the Agency, when it adjudicates
63
a matter after Year One, is to treat an earlier return to work.
The Agency's interpretation of this ambiguous provision, finding
that claimant's return to gainful employment prior to the lapse of a
twelve month period after the onset of impairment precluded a
determination of disability, was found to be reasonable.64 But the
facts, analysis and conclusion of the Justices in Walton do not require
findings that the provision of the SSA statute at issue in Thomas was
ambiguous or that the Agency's interpretation of the provision's text
to avoid consideration in its step four of the existence of gainful
The question whether Chevron
employment was reasonable.
deference has to be applied to SSA's truncation of the statute's
"substantial gainful activity" component of the definition of disability
thus remains open.65
One of the points emphasized by Justice Breyer in according
Chevron deference to SSA in Walton was that the Agency's
interpretation of the statute's "not less than 12 months" requirement
made "considerable sense in terms of the statute's basic objectives." 66
The SSA statute
demands some duration requirement. No one claims
that the statute would permit an individual with a
chronic illness - say high blood pressure - to qualify

for benefits if that illness, while itself lasting for a
63. Id. at 1273.

64. Id.
65. Walton, 122 S. Ct. at 1270.

66. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994)).
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year, were to permit a claimant to return to work after
only a week, or perhaps even a day, away from the
job. The Agency's interpretation supplies a duration
requirement, which the statute demands, while doing
so in a way that consistently reconciles
the statutory
67
"impairment" and "inability" language.
Quite to the contrary of SSA's interpretation in Walton
reconciling statutory terms, its interpretation in Thomas not only
made no effort to reconcile the statute's requirements of "inability"
and "physical or mental impairment" with the existence of
"substantial gainful activity," but the Agency purged the term
"substantial gainful activity" from any consideration at the crucial
decisional stage. 68 Far from making "considerable sense in terms of
the statute's basic objective," 69 that interpretation by SSA in Thomas
was arguably arbitrary and warranted correction.
That the Third Circuit majority was right in proclaiming "the
touchstone of 'disability' is the inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity that exists in the national economy"7 was supported
implicitly by Congress's meticulous explanation of what it meant by
"work which exists in the national economy.",7 1 Why would
legislators proceed to enlarge on that term as "work which exists in
significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives
or in several regions of the country"7 2 in the key paragraph of the
statute defining disability, if they intended, as SSA alleges, to
authorize the Agency to exclude from consideration in determining
"disability" whether work the claimant can perform "exists in the
73
national economy?
Congress' juxtaposition of "disability" and "inability" with
engagement in "substantial gainful activity" also contributes
semantic support to the Third Circuit majority position. A Congress

67. Id.
68. Thomas, 294 F.3d at 572. But see Walton, 122 S. Ct. at 1270.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Walton, 122 S. Ct. at 1270.
Thomas, 294 F.3d at 573.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1994).
Id.
Id.
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indifferent to the bearing of the marketplace on disability could have
defined "disability" as "inability to engage in any activity," but the
legislators chose explicitly to modify the noun "activity" with two
significant marketplace adjectives. The "activity" claimant was
unable to perform had to be "gainful," and had to exist in the
marketplace to a particular degree: "substantiality". The marketplace
factor of "substantial gainful activity" was thus made an integral,
required component of determinations of "disability." While in no
way at issue in Walton, this "touchstone of disability" lies at the core
of the dispute in Thomas.
The Third Circuit majority's reasoning and conclusion in Thomas
honors the plain meaning of "substantial gainful activity" as a
defining statutory component of "disability" and, in addition, makes
"considerable sense in terms of the statute's basic objective."

